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t Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1998; B.S., University of Michigan, 1995. This is an introduction to a special
symposium issue of The Wayne Law Review commemorating the centennial of the
Boundary Waters Treaty. The Boundary Waters Treaty Centennial Symposium was held
on February 5, 2009, in Detroit, Michigan. Special thanks are due to Matthew Moussiaux,
Robert Murkowski, Jane Mirchuk, and especially Charla Burill, along with the rest of The
Wayne Law Review's Executive Board and members, as well as the many distinguished
speakers and panelists that contributed to the symposium's success. Portions of this
Article are based on several of the author's previously published articles: Noah D. Hall,
Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 681 (2007); Noah D. Hall, The Evolving Role of Citizens in United States-
Canadian International Environmental Law Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 131
(2007); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405 (2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 19091 has now provided the
foundation for transboundary United States-Canadian water management
for a century. During the one hundred years that the Boundary Waters
Treaty has been in place, both the law and the world in which the law
operates have changed dramatically. Some of the most relevant and
significant changes have been several fold increases in population and
thousand fold increases in gross domestic product in North America
2
with correlating increased environmental impacts, the growth of
international law and governance institutions, the emergence of modern
environmentalism and the resulting creation of domestic and
international environmental law, and most recently globalization and
new economic trade laws. Despite all of this, the Boundary Waters
Treaty has remained totally unchanged, never altered or amended in any
way. Yet it continues to be as important and relevant as it was in 1909,
and perhaps more so.
In establishing the principles of mutual obligation to protect shared
natural resources, institutional governance independent from national
self-interest, and dispute resolution through investigation and
1. Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448
[hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
2. In 1909, the United States had an estimated population of 90,490,000. See U.S.
Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s-
/popclockest.txt. (last visited May 24, 2009). By 2008 the estimated population had
increased 336%, to 304,059,724. See U.S. Census Bureau, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited May 24, 2009).
During the same period, from 1909 to 2008, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
United States grew from an estimated $32.2 billion to $14,280.7 billion, an increase in
44,350%. See Measuring Worth, available at http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/
(last visited May 24, 2009). From 1909 to 2008, Canada's population increased from an
estimated 6,800,000 to 33,441,277, an increase of 492%. See Statistics Canada, available
at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/ 1-516-x/pdf/5500092-eng.pdf (last visited May 24,
2009). Canadian GDP increased 47,023%, from $3.306 billion in 1909 to $1,564 billion
in 2008. M.C. URQUHART, NEW ESTIMATES OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, CANADA,
1870-1926: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT, IN LONG-TERM FACTORS
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROwTH 14 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds.,
1992) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9678.pdf (last visited May 24, 2009);
see also CIA World Factbook, Canada, available at https://www.cia.gov/-
library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ca.html (last visited May 24, 2009);
Inflation Calculator, Bank of Canada, available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca-
/en/rates/inflationcalc.html (last visited May 24, 2009) (calculating from $1.787 billion
in 1984 Canadian dollars to $3.306 billion in 2008 Canadian dollars).
1418 [Vol. 54:1417
2008] CENTENNIAL OF BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
information exchange, the Boundary Waters Treaty was well ahead of its
time and became a model for transboundary resource management. But
while the Boundary Waters Treaty and its International Joint
Commission were setting the bar in 1909, they may be behind the curve
in 2009. Problems of freshwater scarcity, climate change, and ecosystem
degradation were not anticipated a hundred years ago, nor were the
public's expectations and demands for citizen participation and
environmental protection. Like any milestone, the centennial of the
Boundary Waters Treaty is a good occasion to acknowledge everything
that the treaty has done to protect North America's freshwater and
provide a model for transboundary resource management. At the same
time, the current challenges demand more than a historical celebration,
but also a critical look at how the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission must evolve to meet the needs of the
next century. This task should not be left to just one person, and
fortunately The Wayne Law Review's Boundary Waters Treaty
Centennial Symposium has gathered over a dozen of the leading experts
in the field3 to learn from the treaty's history and contemplate its future.
This introductory Article has four parts. Part I provides an overview
of the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty and its key provisions. Part
II examines the direct progeny of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the
binational agreements and arbitral decisions that the treaty gave rise to.
Part III looks at more recent approaches to U.S.-Canadian transboundary
water management and pollution dispute resolution that rely less on the
Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission. Finally,
Part IV introduces the excellent contributions by leading scholars and
practitioners to this special symposium issue, demonstrating the diverse
perspectives on the Boundary Waters Treaty's past successes and future
challenges.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS
TREATY
The United States and Canada share an approximately 5,000 mile
border that crosses 150 rivers and lakes.4 Included in these boundary
rivers and lakes are the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, the world's
largest surface freshwater system, containing ninety-five percent of the
3. See Wayne State University, Wayne Law Review to Host 'Boundary Waters
Treaty Centennial Symposium' on Feb. 5, available at http://media.wayne.-
edu/2009/01/06/wayne-law-review-to-host-boundary-waters (last visited May 24, 2009).
4. See Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and
Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 682 (2007).
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fresh surface water in the United States and twenty percent of the world's
supply.5 Almost half of the waterways flow from the United States to
Canada (and just over half flow from Canada to the United States), 6
creating an almost perfect reciprocal balance in the control of water
resources that has led to an unusually cooperative binational relationship.
The genesis of the Boundary Waters Treaty dates to 1903, when the
United States and Canada first established the International Waterways
Commission to address potentially conflicting rights in the countries'
shared waterways.7 The International Waterways Commission soon
recommended that the United States and Canada adopt legal principles to
govern uses of their shared waters and form an international body to
further advance protection of boundary waters.8 In 1907, the
International Waterways Commission drafted a proposed treaty, which
was modified through negotiations and eventually led to the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909. 9
The Boundary Waters Treaty primarily provides for joint
management and cooperation between the United States and Canada for
the two countries' shared boundary waters. "Boundary waters" are
defined by the treaty as:
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers
and connecting waterways. . . along which the international
boundary between the United States and. . . Canada passes,
including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof, but not including
tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into
such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing from such
lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing
across the boundary.' 0
While tributary rivers and streams, as well as tributary ground
waters, are excluded from coverage, the Boundary Waters Treaty does
5. GREAT LAKES COMMISSION, TOWARD A WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 9 (2003),
available at http://www.glc.org/wateruse/wrmdss/finalreport/pdf/WR-ExSum-2003.pdf
(last visited May 24, 2009).
6. David G. Lemarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States
Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221, 223 (1986).
7. Jennifer Woodward, International Pollution Control: The United States and
Canada-The International Joint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325,
326 (1988) (citing INT'L JOINT COMM'N, SixTH ANNUAL REPORT ON WATER QUALITY 10
(1978)).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, at preliminary art.
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govern four of the five Great Lakes (Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie, and
Ontario, as only Lake Michigan sits entirely within the United States),
and other rivers and lakes that straddle or cross the United States-
Canadian border."
Navigation and access to boundary waters, not water management,
were the principle concerns at the time the treaty was negotiated.
2
Nonetheless, the first draft of the proposed treaty included a provision
forbidding water pollution having transboundary consequences. The
international commission that would administer the treaty would have
been vested with "such police powers" to enforce this rule. 13 The United
States Secretary of State objected to these provisions, agreeing only to an
anti-pollution provision limited to the defined boundary waters and no
enforcement jurisdiction for the international commission. 14
Thus, Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty simply provides:
"[i]t is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters
and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either
side to the injury of health or property on the other."'15 There was some
opposition to even this more limited provision in the United States
Senate when ratification was being debated, founded on the risk of
creating an international water pollution police power. Canada responded
by assuring the United States Senators that the provision would be
enforced only in "more serious cases.,16
While the Boundary Waters Treaty anti-pollution provision is more
limited than Canada would have liked, it establishes a clear standard for
limiting pollution of shared transboundary waters. 17 Pollution of shared
transboundary waters is of course just one form of transboundary water
pollution, as transboundary pollution often follows an indirect path of
tributaries and different media (e.g., airborne pollution that is eventually
deposited into water bodies through precipitation). Nonetheless, the
underlying legal principle of Article IV, that one country's pollution
should not harm another country, has provided a foundation for United
States-Canadian international environmental law.'8
11. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405, 417 (2006).
12. See F.J.E. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5 OTrAWA L.
REv. 65, 67 (1971).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
16. Jordan, supra note 12, at 67-68.
17. See Hall, supra note 4, at 693-94.
18. Id.
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The Boundary Waters Treaty also addresses the taking and diversion
of boundary waters. Article III of the treaty provides that neither party
may use or divert boundary waters "affecting the natural level or flow of
boundary waters on the other side of the [border]line" without the
authority of the International Joint Commission.' 9 The International Joint
Commission is a six member investigative and adjudicative body with
the United States and Canada equally represented by political
appointees.2 0 It is well-respected in both countries and is often
"commended for its objectivity and leadership on environmental
issues.,,2 1 The International Joint Commission's reports typically rely on
"the best available science and [are] free of political biases," making it
an important source of information for "the public and decision makers
in the United States and Canada. 'z
"Scores of issues have been referred to the International Joint
Commission for non-binding investigative reports and studies" pursuant
to Article IX of the treaty.23 "The Boundary Waters Treaty only requires
a reference from one of the countries to invoke this process, although as
a matter of custom this has always been done bilaterally with the support
of both countries., 24 "This bilateral approach has strengthened the
credibility of International Joint Commission reports and
recommendations, and ensured sufficient funding for its efforts. These
non-binding reports and studies, along with the objective
recommendations that are often requested, have proven valuable in
diplomatically resolving [numerous] transboundary water disputes and
crafting" new water protection policies.25
III. THE DIRECT PROGENY OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
While the Boundary Waters Treaty has remained unchanged and
unaltered for a century, a landmark international arbitral decision and
several binational agreements between the United States and Canada
have supplemented the basic principles of the Boundary Waters Treaty
and the work of the International Joint Commission. The Trail Smelter
19. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. III.
20. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. VII; Hall, supra note 11, at 417-
418.
21. Hall, supra note 11, at 417-18.
22. Hall, supra note 4, at 707.
23. Id. at 706.
24. Id. at 706-07 (citing Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX).
25. Id. at 707.
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arbitration,26 while not managed or decided directly pursuant to the
Boundary Waters Treaty, applied the treaty's principles in a binding
tribunal decision. The Columbia River Treaty,27 signed in 1961, was a
direct result of the deliberations and cooperative work of the
International Joint Commission. Finally, the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, first entered into in 197228 and substantially amended in
197829 and 1987, 30 built on the Boundary Waters Treaty and transformed
the International Joint Commission into an environmental protection
institution.
A. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
The Trail Smelter arbitration concerned transboundary air pollution,
not water pollution or management.31 Nonetheless, any discussion of the
Boundary Waters Treaty and U.S.-Canadian transboundary
environmental law would be incomplete without recognizing this
landmark decision. The decision remains the defining precedent for
transboundary pollution liability through any media, including water.
The facts of the dispute are best told by quoting directly from the final
1941 arbitration decision:
In 1896, a smelter was started under American auspices near the
locality known as Trail [in British Columbia, located on the
Columbia River about seven miles north of the United States
border and Washington State.] In 1906, the Consolidated Mining
and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited . . . acquired the
smelter plant at Trail. . . . Since that time, the Canadian
company, without interruption, has operated the Smelter, and
from time to time has greatly added to the plant until it has
become one of the best and largest equipped smelting plants on
26. Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1938)
[hereinafter Trail Smelter I]; Further proceedings, 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941) [hereinafter
Trail Smelter I1].
27. Treaty for the Cooperative Development of the Columbia River Basin, Can.-U.S.,
Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.N.S.T. 1555 [hereinafter Columbia River Treaty].
28. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23.1 U.S.T. 301
[hereinafter 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement].
29. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, as amended, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30
U.S.T. 1384 [hereinafter 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement].
30. Protocol on Great Lakes Water Quality, as amended on October 16, 1987,
Amending the 1978 Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada, U.S.-
Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551 [hereinafter 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement].
31. Trail Smelter II, supra note 26, at 1945.
1423
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the American continent. In 1925 and 1927, two stacks of the
plant were erected to 409 feet in height and the Smelter greatly
increased its daily smelting of zinc and lead ores. This increased
production resulted in more sulphur dioxide fumes and higher
concentrations being emitted into the air. In 1916, about 5,000
tons of sulphur per month were emitted; in 1924, about 4,700
tons; in 1926, about 9,000 tons-an amount which rose near to
10,000 tons per month in 1930. In other words, about 300-350
tons of sulphur were being emitted daily in 1930.... From 1925,
at least, to 1937, damage occurred [to private farms and timber
lands] in the State of Washington resulting from the sulphur
dioxide emitted from the Trail Smelter....
Canada and the United States had initially referred the matter to
the International Joint Commission for a factual study of the
liabilities and damages. In 1931, the International Joint
Commission determined that the United States had suffered US
$350,000 (equivalent to approximately US $5,000,000 in 2006
dollars) in accrued damages through January 1, 1932, and
recommended pollution controls to reduce future harm. Despite
the International Joint Commission report, in 1933 the United
States was still not satisfied and again complained 'to the
Canadian Government that existing conditions were entirely
unsatisfactory and that damage was still occurring.'
The subsequent diplomatic negotiations led the United States and
Canada to sign and ratify a convention in 1935. Through the
convention, the two countries 'agreed to refer the matter to a
three-member arbitration tribunal composed of an American, a
Canadian, and an independent Chairman (a Belgian national was
ultimately appointed).'
The arbitration tribunal's 'most significant charge . . . was to
decide whether the Canadian smelter should be required to cease
causing damage in the State of Washington in the future, and
what 'measures or regime, if any, should be adopted or
maintained' by the smelter, in addition to future indemnity and
compensation. To answer these questions, the tribunal was
directed to 'apply the law and practice followed in dealing with
cognate questions in the United States of America as well as
International Law and Practice, and shall give consideration to
the desire of the High Contracting Parties to reach a solution just
to all parties concerned.'
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The arbitration tribunal's ultimate 1941 decision (Trail Smelter
II) answering these questions became a historic precedent for
international transboundary pollution law. The tribunal first
concluded that there was no need to chose between the law of the
United States or international law to decide the case, 'as the law
followed in the United States in dealing with the quasi-sovereign
rights of the States of the Union, in the matter of [transboundary]
pollution, whilst more definite, is in conformity with the general
rules of international law.' The tribunal first cited a leading
international law authority: 'As Professor Eagleton puts it in
(Responsibility of States in International Law): A State owes at
all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by
individuals from within its jurisdiction.' The tribunal
supplemented this general rule with a comprehensive summary
of the United States Supreme Court's decisions on interstate
transboundary 3
2
water disputes. Taking these decisions as whole, the tribunal stated the
following principles for transboundary pollution disputes:
[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the cause is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
33
The tribunal further held 'that the Dominion of Canada is
responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail
Smelter.' Therefore, it is 'the duty of the Government of the
Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in
conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under
international law as herein determined.' Applying these
principles to the dispute at hand, the tribunal required the Trail
Smelter to 'refrain from causing any damage through fumes in
the State of Washington.34
32. Hall, supra note 4, at 698 (internal citations omitted).
33. Trail Smelter 1I, supra note 26, at 1965.
34. Hall, supra note 4, at 698 (internal citations omitted).
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The liability rule of the Trail Smelter arbitration has become a
defining principle of international environmental law. 35 It was
incorporated into Principle 21 of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment Stockholm Declaration of 197236 and later
reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development Rio Declaration of 1992. 37 It should also
be noted that:
while the principle is often declared, it has not been applied to
actually prohibit all transboundary harm. Instead, the principle is
often considered to be limited to 'significant or substantial'
transboundary harm [which is not well defined under
international law environmental law], and perhaps further limited
to include only a duty by the source state to 'undertake due
diligence' to prevent significant or substantial transboundary
pollution harm.
38
Yet even with these modifying limitations, the Trail Smelter arbitration
has provided a foundation for international transboundary pollution
policy in North America and throughout the world.
B. The Columbia River Treaty
The deliberations of the International Joint Commission have at
times led to the negotiation of a new treaty specifically addressed to a
particular basin or problem. The leading example is the Columbia River
Treaty,39 which was signed in 1961 after more than a decade of
negotiations. The treaty governs flood control and hydroelectric power
development in the Columbia River basin.40 Fifteen percent of the
Columbia River basin is in Canada, and the remainder is in the United
States.41 The river itself originates in the American state of Montana,
35. Id. at 699.
36. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A./CONF. 48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972).
37. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992).
38. Hall, supra note 4, at 700 (citing John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 294 (2002)).
39. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27.
40. Id. at A Proclamation.
41. See ROBERT E. BECK, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 198 (1991 ed., 2006,
replacement vol.).
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flows north into the Canadian province of British Columbia, then south
into the American state of Washington before forming a portion of the
state border between Washington and Oregon.42
The high volume and precipitous descent of the river make it
particularly well-suited for power generation.43 However, the seasonal
flows of the Columbia are out of phase with power demand in the Pacific
Northwest. 44 The peak power demand in the Pacific Northwest is in the
winter when the Columbia's flow (and power potential) is at a low. 45
Maximum flow on the river, which can be forty times the minimum,
occurs in May. As a result, large storage reservoirs in both the United
States and Canada are needed in order to realize the full electricity-
generating potential of the Columbia.46 In 1944 and again in 1959, the
United States and Canada asked the International Joint Commission for
input on how to best develop the waters of the Columbia River.47 As the
International Joint Commission deliberated, disputes between the two
countries over how to share costs and benefits of development continued
for almost two decades. The two countries signed the Columbia River
Treaty on January 17, 1961, and following some clarifications and
adjustments, the treaty was finally ratified by both the United States and
Canada in 1964.48
One of the principal subjects of the treaty is flood control. The
Columbia River Treaty uses an 1894 flood-the largest Columbia River
flood on record-as a reference point.49 In order to control a flood like
the 1894 flood, storage capacity of 17,300,000 acre-feet is required. 50
Another reference point used by the treaty is the flow of the Columbia at
a town called the Dalles, in the American state of Oregon. 51 The Dalles is
approximately 75 miles upriver from Portland.52 If 17,300,000 acre-feet
of storage had been available and used during the 1894 flood, peak flow
at the Dalles would have been 800,000 cubic feet per second.53
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 199.
45. Id. at 198.
46. Id. at 199.
47. BECK, supra note 41, at 199-201.
48. Id. at 201-02.
49. Id. at 202.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Distance from Portland, Oregon to The Dalles, available at
http://www.distance-calculator.co.uk/usa-distance-portland-to-thedalles.htm (last visited
May 24, 2009).
53. BECK, supra note 41, at 202.
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When the Columbia River Treaty was being negotiated, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers established a storage goal of 32,500,000
acre-feet. 54 At the time the treaty was signed, only about 10,800,000
acre-feet of usable storage existed on the river.55 The treaty, thus,
requires Canada to provide 15,500,000 acre-feet of additional storage.56
Of the 15,500,000 acre-feet, 8,450,000 acre-feet was to be provided at
the outset and to be maintained for sixty years from the date of
ratification.57 The remainder is to be provided if after all U.S. storage
facilities are used it is still not possible to limit flow at the Dalles to
600,000 cubic feet per second.5 8 However, even after the sixty-year
period expires, the United States can call on Canada for help in
controlling floods for as long "as the flows in the Columbia River in
Canada continue to contribute to potential flood hazard in the United
States.,59 The treaty also provides for payment schedules for the storage,
with the United States paying specific sums to Canada as well as
providing Canada with electric power equal to what Canada lost as a
result of operating the storage necessary for flood control.6°
Closely related to flood control is hydroelectric power. The
Columbia River drops 1,288 feet between the Canadian border and the
Pacific Ocean.61 The dams that utilized this drop around the time the
treaty was signed, however, had little or none of the storage capacity
required by the high winter energy demands in the Pacific Northwest.62
The (up to) 15,500,000 acre-feet of storage provided by Canada under
the Columbia River Treaty remedies this problem. Since the Canadian
storage accrues a significant benefit to the United States, the two
countries agreed to divide all downstream benefits equally.63 This results
in a power allotment to Canada that is more than it needs. Therefore, the
treaty allows Canada to sell surplus power, which in turn gives the
United States the ability to supplement its power supply during
shortages. 64
The Columbia River Treaty also bans diversions (even those within
the Columbia River basin) unless they are made with the consent of the
54. Id. at 202-03.
55. Id. at 203.
56. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, at annex A.
57. Id. at art. IV(2).
58. Id.
59. Id. at art IV(3).
60. BECK, supra note 4142, at 204-05.
61. Id. at 205.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206.
64. Id. at 207.
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other country.65 However, there are a few specific exceptions.66 First,
diversions for consumptive uses are allowed.67 Consumptive uses under
the treaty include domestic, municipal, stock watering, irrigation,
mining, or industrial (but not hydroelectric) uses.68 Also, the treaty
provides for certain specified diversions of stream flow from one
tributary of the Columbia into another (or the main stem of the
Columbia).69
The Columbia River Treaty established two permanent bodies to
administer development of the Columbia River basin: (1) a joint
Canadian-American agency consisting of two "operating entities; and (2)
the Permanent Engineering Board., 70 The operating entities have several
responsibilities, including: calculating the amount of hydroelectric power
due to Canada; calculating payments due under the treaty; calculating the
value of downstream benefits; and coordinating flood control and
hydroelectric operating plans. 71 The treaty provides operating plans, but
it also gives the operating entities the flexibility to prepare plans that will
be more advantageous to the two countries in the future.72 The
Permanent Engineering Board is composed of two members from each
country and works in cooperation with the operating entities.73 The
Board's responsibilities include recording river flows, making
inspections, reporting deviations in flood-control and operating plans,
making recommendations for remedial action, reconciling technical
differences that arise between the operational entities, and settling
disputes over flood control storage.74
If the countries are unable to resolve a dispute under the Columbia
River Treaty, either party may refer the dispute to the International Joint
Commission pursuant to the Boundary Waters Treaty.75 The International
Joint Commission, which can act at the request of only one party, has
three months (unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties), to settle the
dispute.76 If it cannot, either country may refer the matter to an
65. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, art. XIII(l).
66. BECK, supra note 4 1, at 208.
67. Id.
68. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, art. I(1)(e).
69. BECK, supra note 41, at 208-09.
70. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, arts. XIV, XV.
71. BECK, supra note 41, at 211.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, art. XVI.
76. Id.
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arbitration board." The arbitration board consists of three members: one
chosen by each the United States and Canada, and one chosen jointly by
the two nations.78 Any difficulties in selecting the members of the
arbitration board are to be resolved by the International Court of
Justice.79 The tribunal's decisions are final and binding.80 The treaty also
permits the United States and Canada to craft alternative dispute
resolution procedures. The two nations have done so several times on a
variety of issues including new storage construction, reservoir filling
81
schedules, and ecological flow management.
The Columbia River Treaty is terminable by either country sixty
years after ratification.82 Written intent must be given ten years before
termination.83 Certain rights and obligations would survive termination.
For example, Canada must operate storage facilities to meet flood control
needs so long as flows in the Canadian portion of the Columbia
contribute to potential flood hazard in the United States.84 Further,
compensation provisions for these flood control facilities remain in
force.85 In addition, if the treaty is terminated before the end of the useful
life of Libby Dam (the storage reservoir of which extends into Canada),
Canada will continue to make available land for the storage reservoir
subject to a Canadian option to divert the waters of the Kootenay River
into the headwaters of the Columbia.86 Finally, the provisions of Article
II of the Boundary Waters Treaty87 remain in effect unless the parties
have exercised other alternatives under Article XVII of the Columbia
River Treaty.
88
The United States and Canada explicitly agreed that the Columbia
River Treaty is not precedent applicable to their other shared waters. 89
Canada insisted on this provision, fearing that the treaty would establish
an inflexible precedent, which could inhibit its freedom to develop other
international rivers. 90 Nonetheless, any party may choose to use the
treaty as an example, and both the Columbia River Treaty and the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 27, art. XVI.
82. BECK, supra note 41, at 213-14.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 215.
87. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
88. BECK, supra note 41, at 213-14.
89. Id. at 215.
90. Id.
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Boundary Waters Treaty have been frequently cited in international
law.91
C. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The evolution of the Boundary Waters Treaty into an environmental
protection agreement and the International Joint Commission into an
environmental protection institution began in the years following World
War II, when citizens and scientists became increasingly alarmed about
water pollution in the Great Lakes.92 In response to these concerns, the
United States and Canada issued a joint reference to the International
Joint Commission in 1964 regarding pollution in Lakes Erie and
Ontario.93 It took the International Joint Commission nearly seven years,
but in 1970 it issued a report recommending new water quality control
programs and the need for a new agreement for cooperative action in
response to pollution.94 Two years of negotiations followed, and in 1972
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and President Richard Nixon signed the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 95
As stated in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the two
countries were:
[s]eriously concerned about the grave deterioration of water
quality on each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing
injury to health and property on the other side, as described in
the 1970 report of the International Joint Commission on
Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International
Section of the St. Lawrence River.
9 6
The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement sets forth general 97
and "specific water quality objectives,' '98 provides for "programs and
other measures" that are "directed toward the achievement of the water
quality objectives," 99 and defines the "powers, responsibilities and
91. Id.
92. See Hall, supra note 4, at 711.
93. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, POLLUTION OF LAKES ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 3 (1971).
94. See id. at 1, 9.
95. 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 28, at 301.
96. Id. at 302.
97. Id. art. II.
98. Id. art. III.
99. Id. art V.
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functions of the International Joint Commission."'00 However, the two
federal governments (specifically the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and Environment Canada), not the International Joint
Commission, have primary responsibility for implementing the programs
and achieving the objectives of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement. 101
The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement focused on
phosphorous pollution, and as sewage treatment improved and phosphate
detergent bans were adopted in both countries, progress was made
towards reducing the transboundary harms from this pollutant. 102 This
success was tempered by new scientific discoveries and resulting public
pressure to address persistent organic chemicals that "were already
affecting the health of wildlife and could be a threat to human health., 103
In response, the United States and Canada amended the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement in 1978 with a new purpose:
[T]o restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. In
order to achieve this purpose, the Parties agree to make a
maximum effort to . . .eliminate or reduce to the maximum
extent practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great
Lakes System.
Consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, it is the policy
of the Parties that... [t]he discharge of toxic substances in toxic
amounts be prohibited and the discharge of any or all persistent
toxic substances be virtually eliminated. 104
Nine years later the parties again revised the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement after a comprehensive review and signed the 1987
Protocol. 0 5 The 1987 Protocol created provisions for "Remedial Action
Plans" for "Areas of Concern" and "Lakewide Management Plans"
which focused on critical pollutants and drew upon broad local
community involvement. °6 While the Agreement has not been revised
100. Id. art.VI.
101. See generally 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 28.
102. Joseph DePinto et al., Great Lakes Water Quality Improvement, ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 20, 752-753 (1986).
103. LEE BoTrs & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT 27 (2005).
104. 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 28, art. II.
105. See generally 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 30.
106. Id. art. VIII.
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since 1987, the two countries and the International Joint Commission
recently conducted a comprehensive review of the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement to address emerging threats to the health of the Great
Lakes.' °7
Despite the lofty goals of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,
its implementation has been undermined by its sub-treaty status-it was
never subject to approval in the United States Senate-and its failure to
contain enforcement provisions. 0 8 Attempts by citizens to enforce the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in court have not been
particularly successful. 109 However, while the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement lacks legally enforceable status in domestic courts, it has
given citizens an increased role in shaping policy to address
transboundary pollution in the Great Lakes." 0
Prior to the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the
International Joint Commission held public hearings on specific topics
but essentially conducted its business in private."' Under increased
citizen pressure, resulting from the growing environmental movement,
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement changed this custom and
opened the International Joint Commission up to the public." 2 The
increased public involvement in the implementation of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement became one of its most significant results. 113
The International Joint Commission affirmed its commitment to public
participation in its Ninth Biennial Report:
The public's right and ability to participate in governmental
processes and environmental decisions that affect it must be
107. See Media Release, International Joint Commission, IJC recommends a new
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement for the 21st Century (Oct. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.ijc.org/rel/news/061024_e.htm (last visited May 24, 2009).
108. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 375, 377 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("Since it does not appear ... that
inadequate consideration was given to this matter, we find no reason to interfere in the
discretionary duties of the Army Corps of Engineers."); see also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying the petition "insofar as it challenges
the reasonable potential procedures").
110. See David L. Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A Review of the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submissions
Process, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 759, 759-760 (2005).
111. See BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 103, at 39.
112. See id. at 39-40.
113. See id. at 39; see also generally THOMAs PRINCEN & MATrHIAS FINGER,
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITiCS 71 (1994).
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sustained and nurtured.... The Commission urges governments
to continue to effectively communicate information that the
public needs and has come to expect, and to provide
opportunities to be held publicly accountable for their work
under the Agreement.'
1 4
The increased opportunity for public participation in decision-
making compensates, to some extent, for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement's failure to contain specific enforcement provisions. With
increased public participation comes increased accountability on the part
of both federal governments to comply with their joint responsibilities
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Equally important, the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has helped create an informed and
engaged citizenry on both sides of the border.
IV. BEYOND THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
While the Boundary Waters Treaty and its direct progeny laid the
foundation for transboundary water management and pollution dispute
resolution between the United States and Canada, more recently new
approaches have emerged that minimize the role of the Boundary Waters
Treaty and International Joint Commission. While some of these
approaches are collaborative, other examples demonstrate the growing
reliance on domestic litigation. This part briefly discusses several recent
developments to illustrate this trend. Two cases, one involving potential
biological water pollution coming from the United States to Canada, and
the other involving ongoing water pollution and contamination that
flowed from Canada to the United States, demonstrate how the Boundary
Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission have been ignored in
favor of domestic litigation. In contrast, the recent signing of the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement'1 5 by the Governors and Premiers and the American and
Canadian Great Lakes states and provinces illustrates that cooperation
along the border is alive and well, albeit at a sub-national level.
114. See International Joint Commission, Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water
Quality: Perspective and Orientation (1998), available at http://www.ijc.org/php-
/publications/html/9br/fs6.html (last visited May 24, 2009).
115. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement
(Dec. 13, 2005) available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-
05/GreatLakes-StLawrenceRiverBasinSustainableWaterResourcesAgreement.-
pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Great Lakes Agreement].
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A. Transboundary Litigation to Protect and Restore Water
Resources
Transboundary litigation has emerged as an effective and relatively
efficient approach to protect and restore transboundary water resources.
Two recent cases involving contentious water pollution disputes in the
Columbia River and the Hudson Bay-Souris River-Red River Basin
illustrate this trend. 1 6 In both cases, decisions by various branches of the
United States federal government encouraged or facilitated using
domestic litigation rather than the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission to resolve the disputes." 7 Ultimately,
while American environmental laws enforced by United States federal
courts have provided the plaintiffs with some legal relief, the cases risk
damaging the binational relationship and the strength of the International
Joint Commission for addressing future problems.
The first case involves the same Trail Smelter facility that was the
focus of the historic arbitration." 8
While the historic arbitration involved transboundary air
pollution, the more recent dispute was over "the hundreds of
thousands of tons of slag (the waste material that comes from the
metal smelting and refining process) that the Trail Smelter plant
dumped into the . . . Columbia River annually from the early
1900s until 1995, when it discontinued the dumping." The
dumping occurred about ten river miles north of the international
border and Washington State. The plant is now owned and
operated by Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation.
It is one of the world's largest zinc and lead refining facilities. It
is also a tremendous source of toxic pollution and waste.
According to one report, in 1994 and 1995 the copper and zinc
discharges from Trail Smelter exceeded the cumulative total for
all US companies, and in recent years its annual mercury
discharges were equivalent to as much as [57] percent of all
United States releases into water.
Not surprisingly, these toxic releases have made their way ten
miles down the Columbia River and into the United States. The
upper Columbia River and connected Lake Roosevelt are now
116. See Trail Smelter I, supra note 26; Trail Smelter l, supra note at 26, at 1938.
117. See generally Trail Smelter I, supra note 26; Trail Smelter II, supra note 26, at
1938.
118. Trail Smelter I, supra note 26, at 1911.
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seriously contaminated. Even the beaches contain toxic
sediments, which can blow in the wind and migrate throughout
the area. The area is home to the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, a federally recognized Native American
tribe. The Confederated Tribes petitioned the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")"19
to address the problem.120 "After negotiations between the EPA and Teck
Cominco broke down, the EPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order
to Teck Cominco pursuant to the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERLCA)12 1 for remedial
investigation.' ' 122 CERCLA establishes "strict liability for generators of
hazardous materials found at hazardous waste sites.' ' 123 "Teck Cominco
responded to the EPA's order by disputing the [domestic agency's]
jurisdiction to assert U.S. law against a Canadian corporation."', 24 "When
the EPA failed to bring an enforcement lawsuit, two members of the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation sued Teck Cominco in
U.S." federal court. 125 "Invoking CERCLA's 'citizen suit' provision, the
plaintiffs sought to enforce the EPA's order."' 126 The ensuing litigation
focused on the applicability of CERCLA to the transboundary
pollution. 127 The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs' claim
did not give rise to an extraterritorial application of CERCLA, since the
offending pollution was located in the United States. 1
28
The second case originates in North Dakota, where water diversions
have created controversies and conflicts between the United States and
Canada for decades. 
129
Historically, much of the attention was centered on the Garrison
Diversion project, which involved construction of the Garrison
dam in 1955, creating Lake Sakakawea to provide irrigation
119. Hall, supra note 4, at 733 (internal citations omitted).
120. Id.
121. U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (2000) [hereinafter CERCLA].
122. Hall, supra note 4, at 734.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
128. Id. at 1082.
129. See Sheryl A. Rosenberg, A Canadian Perspective on the Devils Lake Outlet:
Towards an Environmental Assessment Model for the Management of Transboundary
Disputes, 76 N.D. L. REv. 817, 820-40 (2000).
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water for lands in the Hudson Bay-Souris River-Red River Basin
and hydroelectric power throughout North Dakota. Canada has
consistently raised concerns about the impact of resulting water
diversions on water quality in Hudson Bay-Souris River-Red
River Basin. To some extent, these concerns have historically
been addressed under the Boundary Waters Treaty through joint
references to the International Joint Commission, as well as
through other diplomatic and bilateral processes. But when a
recent dispute over a related water diversion project was not
resolved through either the International Joint Commission or
other diplomatic means, concerned Canadians (joined by some
American allies) turned to domestic litigation in United States
courts.
The case Manitoba v. Norton, involves a dispute over the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation's proposed Northwest Area Water
Supply ("NAWS") project in North Dakota. Congress authorized
the NAWS project in the Dakota Water Resources Act of 2000.
It would be the first federal project to transfer Missouri River
water across the north-south continental basin divide, essentially
bringing water that would eventually flow into the Gulf of
Mexico to Canada's Hudson Bay. The project would divert over
three and one-half billion gallons of Missouri River water
annually (approximately ten million gallons per day) through a
series of pipelines to eight counties in North Dakota for
municipal, rural, and industrial water supply. The communities
that would receive the water are north of the Continental Divide,
and the water would drain into the Hudson Bay Basin, which
includes large portions of North Dakota, as well as Lake
Winnipeg and Hudson Bay in Canada. If completed, this $145
million (U.S.) project would serve about 81,000 people.
The federal government of Canada, the Province of Manitoba,
and numerous citizens and [non-governmental organizations]
from both countries have consistently objected to the project
because it would biologically pollute Canadian waters (and
tributaries in the United States) by introducing non-native
invasive species from the Missouri River basin into Lake
Winnipeg and the Hudson Bay.130
130. Hall, supra note 4, at 727 (internal citations omitted).
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Introduced pathogenic bacteria and viruses could devastate Canadian
fisheries.13 ' Opponents of the project challenged the lack of an
environmental impact assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act in a lawsuit in U.S. federal court.132 The court ruled in favor
of the project opponents, determining that:
[The Missouri River and Hudson Bay] basins have distinct
ecological characteristics and contain different species of fish
and other aquatic organisms, as well as pathogenic species such
as bacteria, viruses, protozoa, fungi, and other microscopic
organisms . . . The co-mingling of untreated water from one
basin into another can result in the introduction of biota-the
various life forms of a particular region or habitat-that may be
invasive and dangerous to indigenous biota. The effect upon fish
of 'interbasin biota transfer'. . . can be devastating.1
33
The case demonstrates the need to consider emerging environmental
issues in transboundary water management. Invasive species were
obviously not a concern at the time the Boundary Waters Treaty was
signed, and the issue has only recently reached any level of prominence
with policy makers and the public. Yet as our scientific understanding of
ecological impacts from water diversions improves, transboundary water
management must evolve. If the International Joint Commission does not
address invasive species issues adequately, citizens will continue to turn
to domestic litigation and other approaches to provide protection and
relief.
B. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water
Resources Agreement
The Great Lakes are the world's largest surface freshwater system,
containing ninety-five percent of the fresh surface water in the United
States and twenty percent of the world's supply.' 34 The five Great
Lakes-Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, and
Lake Ontario, along with the St. Lawrence River and connecting
channels--contain about 5440 cubic miles of fresh surface water, with
131. Manitoba, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 45-50.
132. See Hall, supra note 4, at 729.
133. Manitoba, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
134. See Great Lakes Commission, Toward a Water Resources Management Decision
Support System for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin 9 (2003), available at
http://www.gic.org/advisor/03/wrmdssinsert.pdf (last visited May 24, 2009).
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another 1000 cubic miles of stored ground water in the basin.'35 About
forty million Americans and Canadians rely on Great Lakes basin water
for their drinking supply. 36 Simply put, more fresh water is at stake in
the management of the Great Lakes than any other single freshwater
resource in the world.
The Great Lakes system covers eight states and two provinces within
the United States and Canada: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Ontario, and Quebec.
Numerous tribes and first nations and thousands of local governments
and municipalities also share legal responsibilities. Management of Great
Lakes water is necessarily an exercise in cooperation among multiple
jurisdictions and levels of government, with many potentially
overlapping legal regimes.
To better manage Great Lakes water within the region, and strictly
limit diversions outside of the basin, the Great Lakes states and provinces
have entered into the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water
Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact) 37 and companion Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement (Great Lakes Agreement). 138 The Great Lakes Agreement is a
non-binding policy between the American states and the Canadian
provinces, implemented in Canada by the provinces and in the United
States through the Great Lakes Compact. The Great Lakes Compact is a
binding agreement between the eight American states that have
jurisdiction over the Great Lakes.' 39
Under the Great Lakes Compact and Great Lakes Agreement, the
world's largest freshwater resource is protected and managed pursuant to
minimum standards administered primarily under the authority of
individual states and provinces. 40 The Great Lakes Compact and Great
Lakes Agreement put riparian water use rules and environmental
135. N.G. Grannemann et al., The Importance of Ground Water in the Great Lakes
Region 1 (2000), available at http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/pubs/WRI04008/ (last visited
May 24, 2009).
136. International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes:
Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States (Feb. 1, 2000),
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/finalreport.html (last visited May
24, 2009).
137. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No.
110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects-
/water/Compactlmplementation.asp (last visited May 24, 2009) [hereinafter Great Lakes
Compact].
138. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 115.
139. Great Lakes Compact, supra note 137.
140. See generally Hall, supra note 11 (discussing the Great Lakes Compact and Great
Lakes Agreement).
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protection standards into a proactive public law regime.' 41 The standards
represent numerous advances in the development of water use law,
including uniform treatment for ground and surface water withdrawals,
water conservation, return flow, and prevention of environmental
impacts. 142 A thorough analysis of the Great Lakes Compact and Great
Lakes Agreement is beyond the scope of this Article and has been
provided elsewhere. 143 What is most relevant for purposes of evaluating
the past and future of the Boundary Waters Treaty is a brief discussion of
the shortcomings of the Boundary Waters Treaty for Great Lakes water
management and the resulting "cooperative horizontal federalism"'
44
approach developed by the Great Lakes states and provinces.
The first limitation of the Boundary Waters Treaty for Great Lakes
water management is evident from the scope of its coverage. By
definition, "boundary waters" subject to the Boundary Waters Treaty
only include four of the five Great Lakes-Superior, Huron, Erie, and
Ontario. 45 Lake Michigan sits entirely within the United States' borders
and is thus not considered a "boundary water" under the terms of the
Boundary Waters Treaty. 46 Further, the hundreds of tributary rivers and
streams, as well as tributary ground water, upon which the boundary
Great Lakes depend are also excluded from coverage under the Boundary
Waters Treaty.
147
In addition to the Boundary Waters Treaty's limited scope of
coverage, its standard for protection offers little practical value. The
respective parties may not use or divert boundary waters "affecting the
natural level or flow of boundary waters on the other side of the
[border]line" without the authority of the International Joint
Commission. 148 The problem with this standard lies in the size and scale
of the Great Lakes. With the enormous volume of water in the Great
Lakes, most diversions would not have any measurable effect on the
141. See id. at 435-39.
142. See id.
143. See generally id.
144. Id.
145. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, at preliminary article.
146. While Lake Michigan is not subject to most of the treaty terms because it is not a
boundary water, the Boundary Waters Treaty does extend its guarantees to the mutual
right of free navigation to the waters of Lake Michigan. See Boundary Waters Treaty,
supra note 1, at art. I. The express extension of the Article I protections for navigation to
Lake Michigan makes the exclusion of Lake Michigan from the rest of the Boundary
Waters Treaty provisions more strikingly evident. See Daniel K. DeWitt, Note, Great
Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 306-07 (1993).
147. See Hall, supra note 11, at 417.
148. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. III.
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levels or flow of the Great Lakes. 149 Almost no water uses and diversions
from the boundary Great Lakes have had a measurable effect on Great
Lakes levels and flows, at least individually. 5° Cumulatively, the
hundreds of Great Lakes withdrawals and diversions may have had an
overall effect, but this concern has never led to any formal allegations of
Boundary Waters Treaty violations.' 51 While individual withdrawals and
diversions from tributary rivers and streams often do have a measurable
effect on these waters, these waters are not protected under the Boundary
Waters Treaty.
52
Finally, while many scholars have recognized the International Joint
Commission's objectivity and leadership on environmental issues, 53 its
ultimate adjudicative power is severely limited. A reference is required
by both countries for a dispute to be submitted to the International Joint
Commission for a binding arbitral decision. 154 By the terms of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the consent of the U.S. Senate is required for
such action. 55 As may be expected, the Senate has never consented to
refer a matter to the International Joint Commission for a binding
decision in the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty. 56
Despite these limitations, the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission have played a critically important role in
studying potential threats to the waters of the Great Lakes and informing
both the public and decision makers in the United States and Canada. 157
However, the inherent limitations of the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission necessitate additional protections and
management programs for Great Lakes water resources on both sides of
149. See Hall, supra note 11, at 417. It took the largest Great Lakes diversion to cross
this threshold. The Chicago diversion at its maximum-and subsequently prohibited-
level of 8500 cubic feet per second (cfs) was found to have lowered water levels in Lakes
Michigan and Huron by 6 inches; see also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 407
(1929).
150. See Hall, supra note 11, at 417.
151. See id. at 417 n.67.
152. See id. at 417.
153. See, e.g., Barry Sadler, The Management of Canada-U.S. Boundary Waters:
Retrospect and Prospect, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 370-72 (1986).
154. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. X.
155. Id. The consent of the U.S. Senate would require a two-thirds majority vote; see
also U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. If the International Joint Commission, with its equal
U.S. and Canadian representation, is unable to decide the matter with a majority vote,
then an umpire is chosen in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of
1907. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. X.
156. See Hall, supra note 11, at 418.
157. See id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, The International Joint Commission and Great
Lakes Diversions: Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54
WAYNE L. REV. 1671 (2008).
1441
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the international border.158 Canada first took such action domestically at
the federal level, enacting new bans on all water diversions and
comprehensive water management programs, some as direct applications
of the Boundary Waters Treaty. 159 While Canada's domestic efforts are
commendable, management of the shared Great Lakes obviously requires
cooperation and coordination, and thus a process began for negotiating
and drafting a new agreement.
State-provincial cooperation in Great Lakes management had been a
regional goal for decades, implicitly promised by the Great Lakes
Charter 160 and the 2001 Annex to the Great Lakes Charter' 61 and
expressly encouraged by Congress.162 State cooperation with Canadian
provinces in the Great Lakes region has obvious ecological and policy
benefits, but raises fundamental legal and political concerns. The
Compact Clause of the Constitution, included in Article I, Section 10,
provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress. .. enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power."' 163 The same constitutional section also provides that "[n]o State
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation. ' 164 Thus, the
prohibition on states entering into a "Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"
is absolute, while the prohibition on states entering into an "Agreement
or Compact," even with a foreign government, is limited only by the
political decision of Congress to consent.
165
158. For historical background on conflicts regarding Great Lakes water diversions,
see generally PETER ANNIN, GREAT LAKES WATER WARS (2006).
159. See International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S.C., ch. 117 (1985), amended
by 2001 S.C. ch. 40 (Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showfulldoc/cs/I-
17///en (last visited May 24, 2009).
160. The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water
Resources (Feb 11, 1985), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs-
/GreatLakesCharter.pdf (last visited May 24, 2009).
161. The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes
Charter (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/-
docs/GreatLakesCharterAnnex.pdf (last visited May 24, 2009).
162. See Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 504, 114
Stat. 2572, 2644-45 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000)).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
164. Id. cl. 1.
165. Despite the plain language of the Compact Clause, congressional consent may not
be necessary for interstate compacts relating to matters in which the United States has no
possible interest or concern or that do not increase the states' political power. See
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) ("Looking at the clause.., it is evident
that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United States.").
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The question of what constitutes a "Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation" versus an "Agreement or Compact" can in theory open
the door to major constitutional issues of separation of powers and
federalism. 66 In the case of the Great Lakes, there is a sensible answer.
Congress has already exercised its treaty powers in this area through the
Boundary Waters Treaty, and it could view any attempt by the states to
enter into a binding management arrangement with the provinces on a
related subject as an impermissible treaty. 67 Further, even if Congress
viewed such an arrangement with the provinces as a compact rather than
a treaty, it would likely reject either the entire compact or the inclusion
of the provinces. This lesson has already been learned in the Great
Lakes; when the Great Lakes states proposed including the provinces in
the original Great Lakes Compact over fifty years ago, Congress rejected
the provincial participation and only approved the compact among the
states. 
68
While Congress would not likely allow a binding agreement between
the states and provinces, it has stated a desire for the states to work "in
consultation with" the provinces to develop a Great Lakes water
management agreement. 69 The states were wise to interpret this
congressional encouragement not as permission to negotiate a compact
with the provinces, but rather to develop a non-binding cooperative
approach to Great Lakes water management that involves the provinces.
Thus, the domestic Great Lakes Compact incorporates the Canadian
provinces through the Great Lakes Agreement's "Regional Body,"
comprised of representatives from each state and province.1 70 The
primary mechanism for achieving this purpose is the "Regional Review"
procedure conducted by the Regional Body.
The Regional Body's authority could be fairly described as
procedural rather than substantive, and its determinations described as
166. It is left to Congress to determine whether a proposed arrangement is a prohibited
"Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" or a permissible "Agreement or Compact." See
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694-95 (1925). This determination may
elude a rigid legal analysis since it is "in a field in which political judgment is, to say the
least, one of the important factors." Id. at 695 n.37.
167. Congress has already refused to authorize the Great Lakes states from entering
into any arrangement with Canadian jurisdictions that could be viewed as a treaty or
limitation of the United States' treaty-making powers when it approved the original Great
Lakes Basin Compact. See Great Lakes Basin Compact Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414
(1968).
168. See id.
169. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 504, 114 Stat.
2572, 2644-45 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000)).
170. See Great Lakes Compact, supra note 136, § 1.2 (defining "Regional Body").
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advisory rather than final. The Regional Body's role includes notice,
consultation, and public participation, but stops short of final decision-
making.' 7 ' The party states and Compact Council need only "consider,"
but not follow, Regional Review findings. 72 The Regional Review
process is also limited to "regionally significant or potentially precedent
setting" proposals (as determined by a majority of the members of the
Regional Body) and considering exceptions to the general prohibition on
diversions. 73 The Regional Review process thus avoids infringing on
federal treaty powers, but still gives the provinces an evaluative and
procedural role that may prove useful for affecting major decisions.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
The recently litigated disputes in the Columbia River basin and
prairie region, and cooperative policy developments in the Great Lakes,
demonstrate that transboundary water management and pollution
prevention remain as relevant and potentially contentious as ever before.
Further, the broad consensus of scholars and policymakers alike is that
the Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission are
valuable and important institutions for continuing the spirit of
cooperative boundary water management between the United States and
Canada. The challenge is to take these one hundred-year-old institutions
and adapt them to meet our collective current demands. Substantively,
issues of freshwater scarcity, climate change, and ecosystem degradation
must be addressed. Procedurally, the public's expectations and demands
for citizen participation and environmental protection must be
recognized. There is significant consensus on both of these general
challenges, and an intriguing diversity of views and proposals to meet
them.
Professor B. Timothy Heinmiller provides a historical and
geographic examination of the successes and failures of the Boundary
Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission. 74 Like all of the
authors in this volume, Professor Heinmiller acknowledges that the
Boundary Waters Treaty was remarkably ambitious for its time. 175
Notably, the scope of the Boundary Waters Treaty, applying to all shared
171. See id. § 4.5.
172. Id. § 4.5(5)(i).
173. See id. §§ 4.5(l)(c), 4.5(l)(f). A state may, at its discretion, and after consulting
with the proposal applicant, seek Regional Review for any other proposal within its
jurisdiction. Id. § 4.5(2)(c)(ii).
174. B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-US Relations
in Abundance and Scarcity, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1499 (2008).
175. Id.
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waters along the 5000 mile border, remains impressive. 176 However, with
the benefit of one hundred years of experience, Professor Heinmiller
examines how well the Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint
Commission have met the challenges of international water conflict
management. 177 His research demonstrates that the conflict management
procedures of the Boundary Waters Treaty have been generally more
successful in managing Great Lakes water conflicts than prairie region
(e.g., Manitoba and North Dakota) water conflicts. 178 Professor
Heinmiller further argues that this varied effectiveness is primarily
attributable to innate differences in water conflicts between these two
regions, with conflicts in the Prairie region generally being more
intractable and less amenable to consensual resolution than those in the
Great Lakes. 1
79
Professor John H. Knox focuses on the primary environmental
provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty-Article IV."8° While
acknowledging that most of the Boundary Waters Treaty does not
concern environmental protection, Professor Knox views Article IV as
one of the Boundary Waters Treaty's most significant contributions to
international law. 181 Article IV incorporates environmental concerns into
the basic premise of the Boundary Waters Treaty, to allow Canada and
the United States to use their boundary waters in ways that would not
unduly interfere with one another.' 82 Professor Knox demonstrates that
Article IV was a harbinger of the international environmental movement
that began six decades later, especially with a focus on transboundary
environmental harm. 183 Since the Boundary Waters Treaty, many
different types of transboundary environmental degradation have led to
numerous international treaties, from those addressing harms that
threaten the environment of the entire planet, such as climate change and
ozone depletion, to those addressing regional harms such as long-range
air pollution and pollution of shared bodies of water, to bilateral
agreements focusing on a transboundary harm of local concern.
84
Professor Knox credits the Boundary Waters Treaty for first introducing
the general principles for the duties of states with regard to
176. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1.
177. Heinmiller, supra note 174.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. John H. Knox, The Boundary Waters Treaty: Still Ahead of Its Time, 54 WAYNE
L. REv. 1591 (2008); see also Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
181. Knox, supra note 180, at 1594.
182. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
183. Knox, supra note 180, at 1591.
184. Id. at 1591-92.
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transboundary environmental harm that is seen in most of these
subsequent treaties. 185
Professor Bradley C. Karkkainen focuses on the importance of the
U.S.-Canadian relationship and the countries' shared natural resources. 1
86
For both countries, Professor Karkkainen argues that it is the single most
important bilateral relationship. 187 While Canadians may understand this
implicitly, he fears that those in the United States do not fully appreciate
it, taking Canada, and the good relationship with it, for granted. 8 The
critically important and valuable shared natural resources cannot be
adequately managed without meaningful cooperation. Thus, Professor
Karkkainen makes clear that the strains in the binational relationship,
which have been badly neglected, must be addressed.' 89
Professor Itzchak E. Kornfeld takes a critical and ultimately positive
look at the International Joint Commission. 9 ° Professor Kornfeld
questions why the United States has grown weary of the International
Joint Commission in recent years. 19' He believes that concerns about
maintaining sovereignty have undermined the role that the International
Joint Commission can and must play in protecting shared waters and
ensuring a cooperative relationship.' 92 Professor Kornfeld demonstrates
that the International Joint Commission can best employ the "concept of
polycentricism" to resolve complex disputes between the United States
and Canada. Thus, Professor Komfeld recommends renewed confidence
and reliance on the International Joint Commission. 1
93
Professor Marcia Valiante considers the flexibility of the Boundary
Waters Treaty in incorporating twenty-first century knowledge and
principles.' 94 She examines this fundamental question by looking at one
of the most controversial issues currently facing the International Joint
Commission--developing an appropriate response to the issue of
fluctuating water levels in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin.'
95
185. Id. at 1588.
186. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Great Lakes and International Environmental Law:
Time for Something Completely Different?, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1571 (2008).
187. Id. at 1571.
188. Id. at 1572.
189. Id.
190. Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Polycentrism and the International Joint Commission, 54
WAYNE L. REv. 1695 (2008).
191. Id. at 1697.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1699.
194. Marcia Valiante, How Green is My Treaty? Ecosystem Protection and the 'Order
of Precedence' under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1525
(2008).
195. Id. at 1530.
1446 [Vol. 54:1417
2008] CENTENNIAL OF BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
Professor Valiante recognizes that this issue has tested the limits of the
Boundary Waters Treaty and the resources of the International Joint
Commission in finding a consensus among all interested parties on both
sides of the border. 196 This raises the legal question of to what extent can
developments in international environmental law be used under the
Boundary Waters Treaty regime. Specifically, does the Boundary Waters
Treaty allow for priority to be given to environmental concerns in
making decisions about the management of shared waters? Professor
Valiante makes a compelling argument that the International Joint
Commission can legally incorporate environmental protection principles
and continue to comply with the Boundary Waters Treaty. 197 However,
she recognizes that a wholesale change in the order of precedence of
management goals in favor of environmental protection cannot be
accomplished without renegotiating and amending the Boundary Waters
Treaty.
198
Lee Botts and Paul Muldoon, authors of the recent book Evolution of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,199 propose a new task for the
International Joint Commission.200 They note with disappointment that
the role of the Boundary Waters Treaty and its offspring, the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, in guiding and assisting governments, has
declined over time. 20 1 Despite the decline, they argue that current
circumstances demand a critical look at the adequacy of Great Lakes
governance arrangements, and the Boundary Waters Treaty can
overcome the challenge of preserving the ecological integrity of the
Great Lakes in the twenty-first century.20 2 As a specific recommendation,
they propose a reference to the International Joint Commission to
undertake a study and evaluation of the Great Lakes governance regime
and make recommendations in coordination with the ongoing review of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.20 3
196. Id. at 1526.
197. Id. at 1548.
198. Id. at 1550.
199. LEE BoTrs & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT (2005).
200. Lee Botts & Paul Muldoon, Using the Boundary Waters Treaty for the 21st
Century: Revitalizing the Great Lakes Governance Regime, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1553
(2008).
201. Id. at 1554.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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A widely respected environmental attorney and advocate, Robert V.
Wright, offers a complementary proposal.2 °4 He argues that the Boundary
Waters Treaty is out of step with modem international environmental
agreements because it lacks specific tools for public participation,
accountability, and access to justice.20 5 These shortcomings will be
compounded by new environmental and social stresses on boundary
waters, including pollution, invasive species, flow and lake level
disruptions, and climate change.206 His proposed solution is a public
submission process that would give added "push" to the International
Joint Commission and domestic governments where and when it is most
needed.2 °7
Professor A. Dan Tarlock provides an insightful (insider's)
perspective on how the Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint
Commission have affected Great Lakes water management policy
development.208 Professor Tarlock focuses on the Boundary Waters
Treaty regime's ability to evolve through state practice beyond its
original dispute resolution function.20 9 While the International Joint
Commission has been challenged by inconsistent support for its
involvement in transboundary water issues in the United States, and the
Boundary Waters Treaty has been severely criticized in Canada for its
limitations, Professor Tarlock sees the regime as continuing to play a
significant role in meeting current challenges.210 Professor Tarlock
examines the recent role of the International Joint Commission in
constructively influencing the development of the Great Lakes
Agreement and Great Lakes Compact as an example of the power of the
International Joint Commission to overcome the Boundary Waters
Treaty's limitations by using its respected status.211
Professor Robert H. Abrams looks for lessons from the Boundary
Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission for domestic interstate
water management and dispute resolution in the United States.21 2 The
204. Robert V. Wright, The Boundary Waters Treaty: A Proposed Public Submission
Process to Increase Public Participation, Accountability and Access to Justice, 54
WAYNE L. REv. 1609 (2008).
205. Id. at 1609-10.
206. Id. at 1610.
207. Id.
208. A. Dan Tarlock, The International Joint Commission and Great Lakes
Diversions: Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54 WAYNE L.
REv. 1667 (2008).
209. Id. at 1668.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Robert H. Abrams, The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 as a Model for
Interjurisdictional Water Governance, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1635 (2008).
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U.S.-Canadian border and Great Lakes are obviously not the only places
in the United States with complex and contentious transboundary water
management challenges. Professor Abrams examines three other ongoing
disputes: (1) a relatively simple cross-border complaint by a downstream
state (South Carolina) that an upstream state (North Carolina) is using
more than its share of water; (2) a complex basin-wide dispute regarding
water use and allocation in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin
shared by Georgia, Alabama, and Florida; and (3) a very recent claim by
the state of Mississippi that urban growth in Memphis, Tennessee is
putting unreasonable stress on the shared groundwater of the Sparta
Aquifer (also known as the Memphis Sands Aquifer). While
acknowledging that differences in the resources subject to management,
the sovereigns, the eras, the institutional capabilities of the parties, and
the political feasibility of reaching a binding agreement in these settings
makes wholesale adoption of the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission undesirable and unlikely, Professor
Abrams sees many useful aspects of the regime for these current
disputes.21 3
Each of these articles, authored by scholars and practitioners with
tremendous knowledge and experience in the field, sings the praises of
the Boundary Waters Treaty for its advancements one hundred years ago.
But from this shared historical acknowledgement come diverse views
about the continuing relevance of the Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission. While there is consensus regarding the
substantive challenges facing boundary water management and the need
for renewed attention to governance, the authors present a spectrum of
views regarding the extent of reform needed. Some advocate modest
changes that can be made within the existing framework while others see
the need for more fundamental changes that would almost certainly
require amending the Boundary Waters Treaty. As with all policy
challenges, open and informed discussion is the foundation for finding
solutions, and collectively these articles provide policymakers and
scholars with a comprehensive and diverse study of the role of the
Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint Commission in
protecting North America's shared freshwater resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
One hundred years ago, the United States and Canada came together
and crafted a model for transboundary water management. The Boundary
213. Id. at 1636.
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Waters Treaty and its International Joint Commission were decades
ahead of their time and, as a result, helped to shape international
environmental law. The Boundary Waters Treaty and International Joint
Commission also produced a significant list of accomplishments along
the U.S.-Canadian border, with the result being a level of peace and
environmental protection that is often taken for granted. But 2009 is no
time to rest on historical laurels. The challenges and new stresses on
natural resources demand an ongoing search for improved solutions. One
characteristic of successful institutions is the ability to adapt to new
circumstances and evolve accordingly. The Boundary Waters Treaty and
International Joint Commission have remained relevant for a century by
adapting and evolving as new challenges arise and new values emerge,
and this must obviously continue. All parties must work towards a goal
of again celebrating the Boundary Waters Treaty a century from now
with peace, prosperity, and environmental protection shared by the
United States and Canada.
